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Abstract
This paper gives a proof of existence of price equilibria under certain parameters for a model
of product differentiation commonly used in the empirical geographic differentiation
literature. This proof is needed because the assumptions of Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) are
not generally satisfied once data is introduced to geographic models. The theorem also has
implications for existence in mixed−logit demand models.
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There have been many recent empirical studies of geographic competition that 
estimate theoretical models of product differentiation (e.g., Davis (2001), Manuszak 
(2000), Thomadsen (2004)).  These studies use discrete-choice models where demand is 
generally derived from a utility function that includes a distaste for spending money, a 
distaste for travel, and an additive residual utility term that specifies how much each 
consumer enjoys the product of each individual firm, which is distributed i.i.d. type I 
extreme value.  Most of these models also specify that the firms with constant marginal 
costs compete through static Bertrand price competition. 
While this stylized model is popular in the empirical literature, there has been no 
proof that static price equilibria exist in these models.
1  Most product differentiation 
papers rely on the proof of existence exposited in Caplin and Nalebuff (1991).  While the 
assumptions in Caplin and Nalebuff hold for many models of product differentiation, 
they do not generically hold for those with geographic differentiation.  In particular, there 
is no way to ensure that the probability density of consumers’ utilities will be ρ-concave 
if real distributions of consumers are used.  For example, it is possible for a market to 
have pockets of areas where consumers live, and other areas interspersed in between 
these where no consumers are present. 
A proof of existence in these models is therefore needed.  Ultimately, this field 
needs a generic proof covering markets with any distribution of consumer and firm 
locations, along with any potential ownership structures.  This paper is less ambitious: I 
prove that pure-strategy equilibria exist under certain (sufficient) parameter restrictions 
for any distribution of consumers and firms when the firms are all operating under 
independent ownership. 
 
2. Geographic Models 
 
  Recent empirical papers with geographic differentiation have modeled demand 
using a discrete-choice framework, with consumers choosing either to purchase one unit 
of the good at firm j or to consume an outside good.  Consumers are spread across the 
market area, but have the same utility function except for differences due to their 
demographics and to their unobserved tastes for each good.   
  The utility consumer i derives from consuming one unit of the good from firm j is  
Ui,j = X'jβ – Pj γ – Di,jδ + ηi,j        (1) 
where Xj is a vector of firm j’s product attributes, Pj is the price at firm j, Di,j is the 
distance between consumer i and firm j, and ηi,j is the idiosyncratic portion of utility for 
individual i at firm j.  β, γ, and δ are parameters, with γ and δ assumed to be positive.  
These parameters are not necessary if the characteristics of the goods are measured in 
appropriate units, but I include them in the model because characteristics tend to be 
measured in units that lead to non-one coefficients (e.g., miles or dollars) in empirical 
                                                      
1 Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) prove existence under some parameter values for a similar model 
(see p. 366).  However, the parameter restrictions and logic of the proof reply on the attributes of the model 
that differ from the empirical models.  Therefore, these proofs can not be applied to empirical models.  
Similarly, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse restrict travel disutility from being too large, while the parameter 
restriction presented below in Section 3 does not constrain travel costs.   
1 papers.  In this case, the parameters are also implicitly normalized by the variance of η. 
  The consumers can also choose to consume only the outside good, in which case 
their utility will be 
   Ui,0 = β0 + πΜ + ηi,o,        ( 2 )  
where M is a vector of the consumer’s demographic characteristics.   
  The consumer purchases from the firm that delivers the highest utility if that 
utility is greater than the utility of the outside good; otherwise they consume only the 
outside good.  Because adding a constant to the utility for every option does not affect 
consumers’ choices, β0 and the coefficient on one of demographics in M are normalized 
to be zero.  I assume that the smallest coefficient of π is the one normalized to be zero. 
  Consumers are spread across the market.  Instead of integrating over a geographic 
space, the consumers' locations are usually approximated as a discrete set of points.   
However, changing the sums to integrals in the proof that follow changes nothing.  Each 
firm’s demand is then calculated in two steps.  First, integrate over the unobserved 
component of utility to get the percentage of consumers at a given location and 
demographic who patronize each firm as a function of the utility parameters.  Then 
aggregate these choices across the different locations and demographics to get the total 
demand for each firm. 
As in the literature, I assume that the ηi,j’s are distributed i.i.d. type I extreme 
value, which implies that when there are J firms then the fraction of consumers of 





















        ( 3 )  
where ϕj = X'jβ – Pj γ – Db,jδ.
2  The demand for each firm is then the product of the 
fraction of the consumers of demographic M at each location b who patronize the firm 
multiplied by the mass of consumers of that demographic at that location, h(b,M): 
∑∑ =
bM
M b j j P S M b h P Q ) ( ) , ( ) ( , , .        ( 4 )  
  Supply is generally modeled by assuming that each firm sets prices according to a 
static Bertrand game.  Formally, let the firms’ costs consist of fixed costs plus a constant 
marginal cost for each unit.  Firm j’s profits are then 
  ( ) j j j j j FC P Q C P − − = ∏ ) (         ( 5 )  
where FCj is firm j’s fixed costs, and Cj is the firm-specific marginal cost of firm j.  The 
fixed costs can be ignored for the sake of profit maximization. 
 
3. Caplin and Nalebuff 
 
  Before proving that a pure-strategy equilibrium can exist for the models used in 
the empirical geographic-differentiation papers, I discuss why the assumptions of Caplin 
and Nalebuff (1991) do not hold for these models. 
  Caplin and Nalebuff assume that there are m firms, each of which produces a 
single product at a constant marginal cost.  The products can be completely described by 
                                                      
2 See McFadden (1973) for this derivation.  Db,j represents the distance between (all of) the customers at 
location b and outlet j. 
2 a vector of product characteristics χ∈R
w.  Consumers’ utilities are then defined as 
U(α,χ,z), where α∈R
n denotes the type of the individual, and z represents a numeraire 
commodity.  Consumers choose to consume one unit of the good which maximizes their 
utility. 
  Caplin and Nalebuff impose two constraints on consumers’ preferences.  First, 
they assume that preferences are linear in type α: 
     ,                       (6)  ( ) () () () χ χ χ α χ α 2 1
1
) ( , , + +
=
+ + =∑ n n
n
k
k k t t z g t z U
where g is a strictly increasing function concave function and tn+1(χ) > 0.  Second, they 
assume that the distribution of α is ρ-concave over some convex support 
n R B ⊂  with 
positive volume: 
       .        (7)  ()( ) () () [] ) 1 /( 1 , 1 0 , 1
/ 1
1 0 + − = ≤ ≤ + − ≥ n f f f ρ λ α λ α λ α
ρ ρ ρ
λ
  While the notation of Caplin and Nalebuff is a bit different to that used for the 
geographic models, it is possible to map the model of Section 2 into that of Section 3.  
The X'jβ term of equation (1) corresponds to  ( ) χ 2 + n t  in equation (6).  The –Pj γ term 








3  The translation of the ηi,j terms into types is straight-forward, but the 
translation of the distance term is not.  However, the distance term can be accommodated 
by creating a vector of potential outlet locations, with tl(χ) = 1 if the outlet is located at 
location l, tl(χ) = 0 otherwise.  In this case, αl = Di,jδ.
4  
  To see why ρ-concavity does not need to hold in real datasets, consider a simple 
market that consists of a line segment with endpoints 0 and 1, and suppose that there is 
only one demographic type M.  Suppose, too, that the distribution of η,  t3(η), is 
independent of the consumer’s location on the line, which is represented as h(b), where 
b∈[0,1].  Let δ = 1, and let h(b) = (1 – b)
2 + b
2.  In this case ρ = – ¼.  Consider the 
following types: α0 = (0,1,0) and α1 = (1,0,0), where the triple refers to the distance to the 
outlet located at 0, the distance to the outlet located at 1, and the value of η, respectively.  





-4 = t3(0) > f(α ½) = h(½)t3(0) = t3(0)(½).   (8) 
This violates the ρ-concavity condition given in equation (7).   
 
Section 4.  Theorem and Proof 
 
Theorem: If consumer utility is as in equations (1) and (2), and firm profits are as 
represented in equation (5) (with all firms under separate ownership), then there 
exists a pure strategy in prices whenever Cj + 2/γ > X'jβ/γ  for every firm.
5
                                                      
3 If the utility function in equation (1) were modified to include random coefficients, then the random 
component of these coefficients would appear here, too. 
4 The utility of the outside good, which has none of the attributes of X or distance, can also be represented 






χ α i,0, g(z)tn+1(χ) = πM, and tn+2(χ) = 0. 
5 If the coefficients on M are not normalized as specified above then the right-hand side becomes (X'jβ – 
min(πM))/γ.  These are sufficient, not necessary, conditions. 
3  
Proof: 
Vives (1999, p. 16) states the following theorem:  Consider a game (Ai, πi, i∈N).  
If the strategy sets are non-empty, convex and compact subsets of Euclidean space and 
the payoff to firm i is continuous in the actions of all firms and quasiconcave in its own 
action, then there is a Nash equilibrium. 
One can constrain the strategy set to the non-empty, convex, compact interval [Cj, 
Cj + 2/γ].  The lower bound is Cj because firms will earn negative profits at lower prices.  
It is also the case that a price above Cj + 2/γ cannot be profit maximizing.  To see this 
latter point, suppose that Pj ≥  Cj + 2/γ.  Then Pj > X'jβ/γ (because Cj + 2/γ > X'jβ/γ).  This, 
in turn, implies that 
γ δ β
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< ½ because the 
numerator will be less than 1.  The firm’s first-order condition will then be: 
  [ ] ∑∑ − − −
bM
M b j j j M b j P S C P P S M b h )) ( 1 )( ( 1 ) ( ) , ( , , , , γ    (9) 
  ≤  [ ] ∑∑ − −
bM
M b j M b j P S P S M b h )) ( 1 ( 2 1 ) ( ) , ( , , , ,   <  0.     (10) 
Thus, a firm’s profits are decreasing in prices for all Pj ≥ Cj + 2/γ.   
  It is clear from equations (4) and (5) that each firm’s profit functions are 
continuous in the prices of all firms.  The final requirement is that each firm’s profits be 
quasiconcave in their own price.  Quasiconcavity holds if profits first strictly increase, 
then strictly decrease, in price.  Since I have already shown that the first derivative of 
profits is positive at the lower bound and negative at the upper bound, it is sufficient to 
show that the second derivative of profits is negative. 
  The second derivative of profits with respect to price is 
  [ ] )) ( 2 1 )( ( 2 )) ( ) ( ( ) , ( , ,
2
, , , , P S C P P S P S M b h M b j j j M b j
bM
M b j − − + − − ∑∑ γ γ . (11) 
Note that this is clearly negative whenever γ(Pj – Cj) < 2 (i.e., Pj < Cj + 2/γ), which is the 
range of prices we were looking at.  QED.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
  While the theorem provides a limited set of conditions under which there exists a 
pure strategy equilibrium, the key property of the parameter restrictions is that no outlet 
receives more than half of the market share from the consumers at any location.  This 
result has implications for existence under mixed-logit demand systems, as would occur if 
consumers had different preferences over a good’s non-price characteristics based on their 
observable demographic characteristics.  In this case, the probability density of 
consumers’ utilities also cannot be assumed to be ρ-concave, as required by Caplin and 
Nalebuff.  However, the logic of the above proof can be used to prove existence if every 
good’s market share will be less than one-half for every demographic group.  
While existence is shown for any distribution of consumers and firms, what is 
lacking are proofs of existence under any ownership structure, as well as proofs of 
uniqueness under either of these cases.  Hopefully the field will soon find these proofs. 
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